The following crossed my mind a few days ago, but the latest xkcd (above) reminded me of it again.
The hubbub in the popular press this past month over Stephen Hawking's new book has surely generated more heat than light, although I imagine that there is some apologetic use in engaging with it insofar as Christians in the pews are confused or scandalized by certain scientific or theological theories with which they are not familiar or not equipped to engage. But for the most part, the discussion seems quite old and rehearsed.
One thing I was wondering, however (and I have not read Hawking's book... only an article or two about it). If Hawking's argument is for "spontaneous creation," isn't this relatively fertile ground for theological conversation? I'm thinking in particular of theological ontologies that place a strong priority on divine freedom in explanation of God's self-determination.
Many of the more theologically interesting responses to the Hawking soundbytes argued against his idea of "spontaneous creation", and did so basically by appeal to traditional metaphysical proofs that make God necessary for the explanation of the universe, etc. etc. That these represented the bulk of the theological defenses over the question of God's existence is telling, I think, and should naturally situate those theologians who have qualms with the traditional proofs on Hawking's side of this "debate" (or whatever) rather than with their fellow theologians. (For what it's worth, this is also probably why so many theologians didn't see any need to respond to the Hawking press releases at all... it was one more yawn of a headline for them insofar as they were already more or less on the same page).
This means, however, that such a theological discussion would not concern whether or not there is a God or what science can tell us about divine existence. The point of contact between Hawking and the theologians is structural, and while it's an interesting point of contact, it also presents some problems. Hawking's "law" is a good deal different than the theological correlate "God", and Hawking's "spontaneity" is a good deal different than the theological correlate "freedom" or "election". So there's a good bit to work out, and the point wouldn't (or shouldn't, at least) be to make Hawking into a certain sort of theologian or to translate theology into scientific idiom in order for it to sound relevant. The point, I think, would more constructively be to talk about necessity, law, freedom, etc. as theoretical concepts in themselves and only secondarily as applied to theology, physics, philosophy, etc. It seems that this particular conversation between theology and physics probably has a bit more potential than the rather mundane stuff that has so far circulated. I'm not the one to pursue such a conversation further, but others might feel that doing so is fruitful.
(and another point to add... for those theologians who have a problem with such understandings of divine self-determination and freedom, the option is always open to carry out the above conceptual analysis but conclude from it that these theologies of freedom are inadequate on the basis of their similarity to Hawking's physics, post-Scotus and post-Kantian bogeymen, or what have you. This at least would offer a more detailed and interesting genealogy than the responses that simply reassert a cosmological argument against Hawking and leave it at that.)
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I think this is the right approach. Hawking's point, it seemed to me, clearly wasn't a disproof of God - what he said was the God wasn't necessary for what we see.
ReplyDeleteAs you say, that upsets cosmological arguments for God, not the idea of God. Honestly, I didn't realize that anyone seriously made cosmological arguments anymore (not that I follow this very closely)! It seems like an argument grounded in semantics more than anything else.
As for this "debate" - I'm quite pessimistic. Is there any real prospect that theologians would even be able to engage a physicist's demonstration that the universe can exist without God? They can talk about the implications of these sorts of conclusions for divine freedom, as you point out, but do you really think they can challenge it effectively? I imagine all that would be done is a little bit of hand-waving at the physics and a restatement of older cosmological arguments. The best hope is probably for another physicist that is reasonably well versed in theology and proofs of God and is inclined to argue against Hawking. I am not a theologian or a physicist, but I'm not going to put much stock in a theologian that tells me Hawking is wrong on this point. I may trust a theologian that tells me what the implications of Hawking's insights are.
btw - I came across this two part Bertrand Russell debate on the cosmological argument the other day:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BWFpBTqSN0
I think he essentially comes to the same point that cosmological arguments can only really survive on the basis of semantic confusion.
Hawking's "law" is a good deal different than the theological correlate "God", and Hawking's "spontaneity" is a good deal different than the theological correlate "freedom" or "election".
ReplyDeleteFor those who may feel as if "spontaneity" sounds too arbitrary to be associated with "freedom" as it is rightly conceptualized, it's also worth pointing out that "law" (in the sense of Hawing's laws, such as gravity) is much more rigid and non-"arbitrary" than "God" as rightly conceptualized (i.e., as the God who freely elects). So while Hawking's spontaneity/freedom may swing too far away from certain constraints, "law" in Hawking swings in exactly the opposite direction (relative to the theologians, that is) by emphasizing constraint to an extent that the concept of God should not emphasize it (at least not for the sorts of theologians that are relevant here).
Does this swing to both of the extremes at once allow for a conceptual balancing-out in the end, when spontaneity/freedom and law/God are taken into account as a whole? Dunno. But it may at least be some consolation for those who would write all of this off as an entirely stillborn connection that I'm drawing.